Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test by Farber, Daniel A.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 4 Fall 2005 Article 12 
Fall 2005 
Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test 
Daniel A. Farber 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel A. Farber, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 70 MO. L. REV. (2005) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/12 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and
Capricious Test?
Daniel A. Farber
l
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Blackmun sat on 3,653 cases during his twenty-four terms on the
Supreme Court,2 yet he will surely be best remembered for his role in one case,
Roe v. Wade. Seldom has a judicial decision been more controversial. True,
many opinions are harshly criticized. But the criticisms of Roe were distinctive.
According to critics, Roe was not merely bad law, in some sense it was not law
at all. One particularly outspoken critic recently calls Roe "perhaps the most
indefensible 'constitutional' decision ever reached by this Court to date'A as
well as "manifestly and atrociously contrary to the Constitution."
5
The Roe dissenters were the first to charge that Roe was an arbitrary fiat
rather than a legitimate, if misguided, decision. In dissent, Justice White ac-
cused the Court of lawlessness:
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to sup-
port the Court's judgments. The Court simply fashions and an-
nounces a new constitutional right for pregnant women and, with
scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right
with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion
statutes .... As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court per-
haps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its
judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power
ofjudicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.6
In other words, according to White, Roe was a simple exercise ofjudicial fiat,
with no pretense to legitimate legal analysis.
1. Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. Portions of
this essay draw on a chapter of a forthcoming book with Suzanna Sherry. © Daniel
Farber and Suzanna Sherry. Very helpful comments were provided by Steven Gold-
berg and by participants in the "Reflections on Judging" conference and in a work-
shop at Vanderbilt Law School.
2. See "Blackmun, Harry Andrew," in CQ Supreme Court Collection,
http://library.cqpress.com/SCC.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Michael Paulsen, Paulsen, J., dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 213 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
5. Id. at 214.
6. Id. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
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Dissenters are often irate, as are ideological opponents of a decision. But
Roe received equally harsh criticism from the academic community. Perhaps
most strikingly, the opinion was lambasted by John Hart Ely, perhaps the
leading liberal constitutional theorist of the century. Although he dedicated
much of his work to supporting the Warren Court rulings, Ely denounced Roe
as lawless. He termed Roe a "very bad decision" because it was "bad consti-
tutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no
sense of an obligation to try to be." 8 Roe was, he thought, uniquely open to
the charge of being utterly constitutionally ungrounded, "a charge that can
responsibly be leveled at no other decision of the past twenty years." 9 He
found no legal basis for the decision. "What is frightening about Roe," Ely
said, was that the "super-protected [abortion] right is not inferable from the
language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific
problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they in-
cluded, or the nation's governmental structure," - nor, he added, from the
relative political weakness of the group being protected.' 0
This a damning indictment. In this Essay, I will not add to the gargan-
tuan literature" about Roe's rightness or wrongness.' 2 Instead, I will focus on
the characterization of the opinion as being in some sense worse than merely
wrong, as being an exercise of raw power rather than a legitimate exercise of
judicial authority. I want to use this characterization to ask more generally
what is required to ground a constitutional ruling properly.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II addresses the role of judg-
ment in constitutional law. If the need to exercise judgment could be elimi-
nated, the difference between correctness and legitimacy would also disap-
pear: a legal conclusion would either be provably correct or simply false. But
judgment is inevitable in law, and this means there must be some legitimate
7. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
8. Id. at 947.
9. Id. at 936.
10. Id. at 935-36. 1 find his argument on the last of these points unconvincing,
though it is stated with so much verve that seeing through it takes some thought. Ely
argued that fetuses are even more of a disempowered minority than women, so that
women are not the relatively disempowered group in this situation. Id. at 934-35. But
this argument simply assumes that fetuses are entitled to be politically represented,
and if Ely really thought that, he should have viewed abortion as murder rather than
favoring abortion reform as he did.
11. For a sampling of views on this topic, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375
(1985); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV.
668 (1984); David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 1.
12. For what they are worth, my views on that question are found in Daniel Far-
ber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); I must
confess to an absence of fresh insight about the abortion issue on my part since then.
1232 [Vol. 70
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range for differences of opinion, because views will differ about how to make
these judgment calls. Unlike mathematics, law leaves us in the position where
we must sometime say: "the result in that case is wrong in my view, but the
court's opinion is reasonable."
Judgment is a subject of great interest to philosophers and psychologists.
As a lawyer, however, I find it more productive to turn to another area within
the law itself for guidance about how to assess "judgment calls" by decision-
makers. Congress gives administrative agencies considerable discretion, but
courts nonetheless review the soundness of the agency's judgments under the
"arbitrary and capricious" test. By analogy, we can apply the same standard to
judicial decisions. The analogy to administrative agencies is especially compel-
ling because, like courts, agencies are charged with interpreting and implement-
ing legal rules created by others. The "arbitrary and capricious" test is the stan-
dard for determining whether the agency has remained within legal bounds.
Before considering the application of this standard to Roe, we need to
consider how to translate it from administrative law to constitutional law. A key
element of the "arbitrary and capricious" test is that the decision includes all
(and only) the relevant factors. This naturally raises the question of what factors
are legitimate considerations in constitutional decisions. Part III explores the
dispute between these constitutional considerations. In my view, the key factors
are precedent, history, and social values. Ideally, a judicial decision in a hard
case should draw on all three. Of course, mentioning the factors is not enough;
the decision must be based on a reasoned analysis of the relevant factors.
Part IV then returns to Roe, asking whether the Court's decision was ar-
bitrary and capricious. If an administrative agency made a similar decision on
similar grounds, would it be reversed for doing so? My answer, in a nutshell,
is that outright reversal would not be warranted, but that the decision would
probably be remanded for further explanation and fact-finding. The Court's
analysis of the right to privacy is sketchy but would be defensible with a little
fleshing out. The Court's trimester system, which is used to balance the rights
of women with the state interest in potential life, is much more vulnerable
because the court presented it with virtually no explanation, consideration of
alternatives, or factual analysis.
Finally, Part V closes with a brief summary. Essentially, the Court did a
much more satisfactory job when it revisited the abortion issue in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 both in terms of justify-
ing the right to abortion and devising a test for violations of that right. Casey
provides a much firmer grounding for the right, and its "undue burden" test
provides more flexibility and room for fact-finding. Of course, by that time,
the Court had the benefit of many years of experience with the abortion issue,
which it obviously lacked at the time of Roe.
13. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming
the right to abortion as a part of constitutional "liberty" but replacing the trimester
system with an "undue burden" test).
2005) 1233
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II. THE ROLE OF JUDGMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First-year law students generally expect to learn a complex system of
clear-cut rules. When they learn that the rules are often murky and contest-
able, they often swing to the opposite view that law is merely a matter of
judicial whim. The hard lesson for students to learn is that the law is both
flexible and structured: issues often do not have determinate answers, and yet
some answers are better than others (and others are no good at all). Thus,
being a lawyer or judge requires the exercise of good judgment, not just
knowing a lot of rules.
Often, even those who can accept this reality in a common law area like
torts, resist it in constitutional law. We want constitutional law to be a clear,
objective mandate, free from the historical currents that drive areas like torts.
With judgment comes flexibility, and we seem to have difficulty admitting
that the Supreme Court really does have flexibility in construing the Constitu-
tion. While this resistance to acknowledging the Court's leeway in constitu-
tional cases is understandable, it is also misguided. In reality, flexibility is
inevitable, and the only useful question is how to channel it.
A. The Unavoidability of the Exercise of Judgment
The most obvious way to deal with the problem of judicial flexibility is to
"solve" it by providing a formula for deciding hard cases.14 This effort to pro-
vide a formula for deciding constitutional cases has become known as founda-
tionalism, because it seeks to build constitutional law form a basic assumption,
much as geometry is based on simple axioms. Of course, no one who offers
such a formula thinks that following that formula is always going to be a
straightforward, worry-free task. Still, foundationalists hope to provide a for-
mula that can resolve constitutional cases, and they claim that their particular
formulas are embedded in the constitutional order or in the nature of the judi-
cial role. Thus, the ideal foundationalist theory creates a pipeline from funda-
mental norms like majoritarianism, liberty, principled decisionmaking, or
equality, to a well-defined judicial methodology.' 5 That methodology may not
guarantee that judges will find the right answer in every case, but faithfully
following the methodology guarantees the decision's legitimacy.'
6
14. One popular approach directs judges to follow the original understanding of
constitutional provisions. This approach seeks to ground constitutional interpretation
in historical inquiry.
15. See DANIEL A. FARBER AND SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1-9 (2002).
16. I am, of course, skeptical of foundationalism. See id. (critiquing leading
foundationalists and explaining the barriers to any successful foundationalist theory of
constitutional law).
[Vol. 701234
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For nonfoundationalists, matters are not so simple. Still, the nonfounda-
tionalist might hope to accomplish something along the same lines, beginning
with a more complex set of constitutional norms and ending with a recom-
mended judicial methodology, albeit one that is more nuanced than the foun-
dationalist's.17 What ultimately defeats these hopes is pluralism. A good con-
stitutional decision, as I will argue later, must be based on some workable
understanding of history, precedent, and public values. Each one of these can
involve complex issues of interpretation, and there is no preset formula for
resolving conflicts between them.
Even for the strictest foundationalist, however, there would be no way to
eliminate the exercise of judgment. A purist believer in originalism would be
faced with the problem of drawing conclusions from a complicated, incom-
plete and conflicting historical record. Deriving conclusions from history is
not always easy; reasonable historians can well differ. In such situations, the
originalist must rely on the judge's good judgment18 in reaching a conclusion.
The same is true of any other method of constitutional interpretation - there
will always be gaps and gray areas where judgment is required.19
Solutions to constitutional problems must be designed with an eye to the
functions of constitutional law. One function of law is social stability, and
one appeal of a formulaic approach is its promise of stability. Fortunately, we
can have the stability without having the formula because stability requires
only that most cases be reasonably predictable. Because there are easy cases,
most of which never reach the Supreme Court, constitutional law can provide
a stable framework for government. We know that the presidential term is
four years from the text; we know that racial segregation is unconstitutional
from judicial decisions - and in neither case is there any uncertainty about the
law. It is important to note that many cases that would have been quite hard to
17. For a discussion of the non-foundationalist approach, see id. at 152-156.
18. To speak of the "judge's good judgment" as a necessary virtue seems almost
tautology, which highlights the oddity of constitutional theories that try to deny the
necessity for this trait.
19. A judge in a hard case is trying to solve a difficult problem. In general, there
is no simple recipe for problem solving, whether the problem arises in law, business,
engineering, or medicine. We can help prepare people to solve such problems in vari-
ous ways - giving them basic tools they need to analyze the problem, talking in gen-
eral terms about good ways to approach problems, and exposing them to case studies
of similar problems. That is, for example, how business schools train corporate man-
agers, and how law schools try to train future lawyers and judges. But there is an
element of creativity in finding solutions that simply cannot be reduced to a formula.
No doubt, it would be wonderful to have some clear program for making
hard decisions. But I rather suspect that the absence of such a program is simply part
of the human condition. Life presents us with hard choices. In making these hard
decisions, we expand our knowledge, revise our understanding of who we are, and
better grasp our fundamental values. Of course, a great many decisions are easy, and
that is an important fact about constitutional law. What is true in personal life is also
true in constitutional law. The big decisions cannot be reduced to a formula.
12352005]
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decide immediately after a constitutional provision was adopted may later
become easy simply because they are controlled by precedent. Thus we need
not fear that the law will be reduced to chaos if we abandon the quest for the
perfect decision-making formula.
Even so, we are left with a serious concern, because the remaining cases
are often most important. Those hard cases raise the greatest controversy and
evoke fears of an imperialist judiciary. If we want to claim that courts engage
in something more than raw policymaking when they decide hard cases, we
need some standard other than preferences for assessing those decisions. In
short, if we cannot provide an ex ante recipe, at least we need an ex post stan-
dard of performance.
If we are stuck with the exercise ofjudgment by courts, and if we cannot
give them a recipe that will guarantee correct outcomes, how do we evaluate
the exercise of judgment? What is the difference between an indefensible
opinion and one that is reasonable, even if arguably wrong? In short, what
makes law an exercise in reasonable judgment rather than an application of
arbitrary force? Defining what makes a judgment reasonable (even if debat-
able) is not easy. We can, however, find guidance from other legal contexts
where the question has arisen, such as administrative law.
B. Assessing Exercises of Judgment
A simple description of legal decision-making would say that easy cases
are covered by existing legal rules, while hard cases involve gaps in the law
where judges exercise discretion, creating new law in much the same way as
legislators. This is too simple a picture for two reasons. First, cases do not fall
neatly into two groups, one in which no legal doubt exists and the other in
which the law offers no guidance. Almost all appellate cases involve at least a
little legal uncertainty (or the lawyers on one side would be fined for wasting
the court's time). Thus we are dealing with matters of degree rather than a
dichotomy.
Second, this model may not be true to the internal decision-making
process used by judges. "Discretion" may be the wrong word, and the anal-
ogy to legislation may be simplistic. Judges in hard cases may feel that they
are exercising discretion, but they may equally feel that they are trying to
solve a puzzle that really does have a "right answer." And in resolving the
case, they may feel that they are not reaching "outside the law" for a policy
solution but "inside the law" for the concepts and values. Thus, the analogy
between judicial and legislative "discretion" is only approximate.
For present purposes, another problem with the simple model of discre-
tionary "gap filling" is significant - it does not provide enough of a basis for
evaluating judicial decisions. According to the model, easy cases produce
only one legitimate answer, while in hard cases every answer is equally le-
gitimate legally and the sole remaining question is whether the judges have
1236 [Vol. 70
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made the best policy choice.20 Yet judges are not in the same position as leg-
islators in terms of their access to information or their freedom from past
precedents. So, if judges are going to try to identify the best policy choice, the
goal cannot really be the same as it would be in the legislative setting. It must
also include the costs of ignoring legal texts or precedents. Yet if the best
policy choice simply means something along the lines of "the best decision
for a court to make, taking everything into account," this standard provides
little or no guidance in evaluating decisions.
What we want, in short, is a form of analysis that recognizes the exis-
tence of judicial flexibility but tries to get a handle on how to assess its
exercise. Discretion is a helpful analogy, but legislative discretion is too
different from judicial flexibility. A closer analogy can be found in admin-
istrative law, where courts scrutinize an agency's decisions to determine if
it has exceeded or abused its delegated authority. Like courts, an agency
must justify its actions in terms of its legal mandates, though at the same
time it has some leeway in applying that mandate. This analogy has the
advantage of being less politically freighted than constitutional decision-
making so that we are less distracted by political agendas in thinking about
the proper limits of decisionmaking. Another advantage is that administra-
tive law seems to be quite well-settled, unlike the hotly contested arena of
constitutional theory. Bear in mind, however, that this is only an analogy:
the Supreme Court is also different from an agency in some obvious and
important ways.
One advantage of the administrative analogy is that it invites us to con-
sider the idea of reasoned decision-making in more mundane contexts than
abortion or affirmative action, which should leave our thinking less clouded
by emotion. The construction of a highway through a park in Memphis, a
much less dramatic issue than abortion or affirmative action, provided the
backdrop for the leading administrative law case regarding agency discretion,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 21 A federal statute barred
funding for any highway through a park unless there was "no feasible and
prudent alternative." 22 The agency argued that this phrase, particularly the
reference to prudence, was essentially a grant of legislative discretion to the
20. In some sense, foundationalists share this model: their goal is to make as
many cases as possible into easy ones because they fear the unbridled discretion in-
vited by hard cases.
21. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For more background on the case, see Peter Strauss,
Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions
Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992). The Overton Park test was
strongly reconfirmed in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (overturning the
recission of an automobile airbag requirement as arbitrary and capricious).
22. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411.
12372005]
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agency.23 But the Court rejected that argument, finding that the statutory lan-
guage had real substance.
24
Still, what is "feasible and prudent" is generally going to be a judgment
call. Thus the agency has real discretion in applying the phrase, although not
the unlimited discretion of a legislature to implement its own views of wise
policy. How does a court review the exercise of administrative discretion?
Here the Supreme Court called for a two-step process, involving a searching
review of the record. The first step is to ensure that the decision was based on
a consideration of the relevant factors (and only the relevant factors). 25 This
will normally require a determination that the agency considered all of the
evidence in light of the relevant factors. The second step is to determine
whether the agency committed a clear error of judgment. 26 Altogether, what
the Court required from the agency is a reasonable explanation of how the
evidence supported its application of the statutory standard. In the context of
the Overton Park decision, this would mean a careful consideration of alter-
nate routes, and mustering evidence to show that they were either infeasible
for engineering reasons or were completely unacceptable for cost or other
reasons.
In administrative law, the standard applied in these cases is called the
"arbitrary and capricious" test.27 This may sound like a very lax standard
indeed. But in reality, the standard has real teeth, and it is not at all uncom-
mon for a regulation by EPA or another regulatory agency to be sent back for
further proceedings.28
23. Id. at 410. In technical terms, the argument was that the decision was "com-
mitted to agency discretion," or in other words, that "feasible and prudent" means
whatever the agent says it means. Id.
24. Id. at 411-13.
25. Id. at 416.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 413-14.
28. Indeed, there is considerable controversy over whether the courts are too
intrusive in applying this test. See Robert Glicksman and Christopher Schroeder, EPA
and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 249
(1991); Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Proc-
ess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Re-
thinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rule-
making, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997). For some examples of highly intrusive judicial
review, see Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(rejecting EPA's use of a standard toxicity test for treatment of aluminum waste,
rejecting the agency's interpretation of data from a site with extreme pH); Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down ban on asbestos
despite its link with cancer); Ohio v. EPA, 798 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1986) (subjecting
EPA's choice of a computer model for air pollution to "searching review"); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reversing EPA's
determination that car manufacturers had failed to demonstrate the practical unavail-
ability of catalytic converters).
1238 [Vol. 70
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The main issue in the Overton Park was how to apply the "feasible and
prudent" standard, but there was also a preliminary question of what the stan-
29dard meant. In a more recent case, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, the
Court clarified the agency's role in issues of statutory interpretation.30 In
Chevron the question was whether the EPA could define the term "source" to
include an entire industrial site or whether each building had to be classified
as a separate facility.3 1 The answer to this apparently trivial question would
make millions of dollars of difference in compliance costs. The Court en-
gaged another two-step analysis. The first step was to consider whether the
statute was ambiguous, applying ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.32
Assuming the statute was ambiguous, the second step was to determine
33whether the agency's interpretation was a reasonable one.
The line between applying a rule (governed by Overton Park) and inter-
preting the rule (governed by Chevron) is not always clear. In constitutional
cases, the Supreme Court does both. Part of its task is to scope out the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision. Other cases require it to apply that meaning
to a particular statute. 34 Attempting to determine which of these administra-
tive law standards of review applies to which specific type of constitutional
case, however, would be unilluminating. Rather, it is more fruitful to take
some simple lessons from the administrative analogy. First, it is indeed possi-
ble to meaningfully review whether discretion has been exceeded or abused.
We are not faced with a choice between pretending that administrative deci-
sions are value free and saying that anything goes because "it's all political."
29. In Overton Park, the preliminary question involved deciding whether the
agency had to show that alternatives to using the park were unacceptable or simply
less desirable. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411.
30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3t. Id. at 840.
32. Id. at 843.
33. Id.
34. The Due Process Clause provides an apt example. The requirement is that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Does a particular state law violate the clause? This question
may sometimes turn on large questions about the meaning of the clause: Does "due
process" mean the specific legal procedures in use when the clause was adopted? Or a
broader concept of fair procedure? When the Constitution says "due process of law,"
does it mean only that some identifiable statute or administrative ruling must apply
and that a hearing must be granted on factual issues? Or does it embody a more "natu-
ral law" conception, under which an enactment is not really "law" (and hence can't be
a basis for "due process of law") unless it complies with certain fundamental require-
ments of justice? These look like questions of "interpretation." In contrast, once these
fundamental points are settled, the Court is still faced with the problem of determin-
ing precisely what procedures would have been used at the time of adoption, or what
specific procedures are fair, or what laws are fundamentally unjust (depending on the
interpretation). These all look like questions of application, and they are far more
common in Supreme Court cases. But the difference is one of degree.
2005] 1239
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The same is true of the kind of judicial leeway involved in constitutional law.
Constitutional law can involve a human factor without being purely political.
Second, the analogy sheds some light on how to assess judicial deci-
sions. As administrative law teaches us, the proper exercise of discretion in-
volves the reasoned analysis of the relevant factors. 35 The first task is to iden-
tify these relevant factors. Much of the dispute in constitutional theory con-
cerns the question of what factors actually are relevant - for instance,
originalists deny that evolving social values are relevant to constitutional
interpretation. 36 Once we determine those factors, we can look at an opinion
like Roe to determine whether the Court gave them appropriate consideration.
III. RELEVANT FACTORS IN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
It may be helpful to leave the stratospheric atmosphere of Supreme
Court decisions and consider a much more mundane problem that an ordinary
governmental employee might face. Suppose that you are new school princi-
ple and that a rule issued by the school board guarantees students a "fair hear-
ing" before they are required to repeat a year. As principal, you are faced with
the question of determining what procedures are required to provide students
with such a hearing. You really want to be thorough: this is your first big
decision as a principal and you want to get it right. Below is a list of ques-
tions that you might want to ask in deciding what procedures to use:
* What procedures did your predecessor and other principals use?
It might be unfair to impose an idiosyncratic set of procedures; in
addition, previous practices may have created justified expecta-
tions on the part of students, and those practices also represent
other principals' judgments who may have known at least as much
as you do. Of course, the circumstances for those other decisions
may have been different, or your predecessors might have been in-
competent, or there may have been a major change in educational
philosophy since they were made, so you might want to consider a
change in existing practice.
* Did the school board have anything specific in mind? For exam-
ple, was the term "fair hearing" borrowed from another setting?
Was the word "hearing" chosen to indicate a live proceeding, or
does it include the opportunity to provide written submissions?
Were there any specific abuses that motivated the rule? When the
35. See 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 13.3 (2d
ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005).
36. This is essentially true by definition - if decisions are going to be based on
the historical understanding of late Eighteenth Century, obviously current social val-
ues will not be part of the basis for the decision.
1240 [Vol. 70
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rule was first enacted, what procedures were used and were they
accepted as fair? (Presumably, there is no formal legislative history
for you to read, but you could probably call some experienced staff
person at the school board and find out what she knows.) The older
the rule, the less useful this inquiry is likely to be.
* What procedures do you consider fair for this kind of hearing?
What rule would be better in the long-run for the school and its
students? Too elaborate, a hearing could give an unfair advantage
to students with educated, affluent parents or lawyers who can take
advantage of the process. An overly elaborate process might also
discourage teachers from recommending repeating a grade. On the
other hand, too little procedure could encourage shoddy decision-
making by teachers, make parents feel frozen out of the process
and lead them to try other routes of influence. Or should the type
of hearing depend on the circumstances of each case, rather than
being subject to a general rule?
In short, as a school principal, you would want to look at history, prece-
dent, and values. Once you have gathered this information, it may not all
point in the same direction, which may leave you with a tough decision. The
fact that it is a tough decision is not a license to act arbitrarily. Even if the
decision turns out to be hard, some answers are more reasonable than others.
Any answer simply is not as good as any other answer, even when there's no
single "right answer."
Supreme Court cases involve a higher level of analysis, weightier social
problems, and more divisive issues than our hypothetical high school princi-
pal must face. Nevertheless, there are also strong similarities. Like the princi-
pal, the Justices must consider precedent, history and values. A detailed dis-
cussion of each of these factors is in order.
A. Precedent
Hardly anyone denies that precedent plays a legitimate role in Supreme
Court decisions. 37 Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider the reasons why
precedent is so important, how precedent is used, and what the use of prece-
dent tells us about the nature of constitutional law. For purposes of this sec-
tion, the term precedent is used to mean judicial precedent. Previous deci-
37. But there are exceptions. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael Paulsen, The Corrupting
Influence of Precedent (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For a trenchant
defense of the legitimacy of relying on precedents even when those precedents were
wrongly decided, see Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 1789, 1822-24 (2005).
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sions by Presidents, Congress, or others may also be entitled to some weight,
but we defer that question until the next section.
There are obvious reasons why any decision maker, such as our hypo-
thetical principal, should consider the views of her predecessors. It would be
arrogant to assume that any one individual has a monopoly on access to true
wisdom. The views of earlier judges are entitled to a respectful hearing for
that reason alone. Justices John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
Louis Brandeis come immediately to mind as great figures in the history of
the Supreme Court, and it would take a hardy ego indeed to view their opin-
ions as unworthy of consideration. Past rulings also have the advantage that
they were uninfluenced by current passions - for example, the Judges who
decided issues of presidential power during the Korean War obviously were
not influenced by the current division of opinion about the Iraq war. Further-
more, older decisions have stood the test of time - we generally know that
they have not caused big problems, whereas a change in rules might have
unforeseen consequences. These reasons apply as much to the high school
principal as to the Supreme Court Justice.
A somewhat more subtle set of reasons supporting stare decisis relate to
the decision-making process. It is simply unworkable address every possible
legal aspect of a dispute in every case. Imagine if, in every First Amendment
case, the lawyers had to reargue basic questions, such as whether the First
Amendment applies to the states or whether it covers non-political speech.
Every brief would have to be a treatise, arguing every point of First Amend-
ment doctrine from scratch, including such issues as whether free speech
restrictions apply to the states and the protected status of non-political
speech.38 Unless most issues can be generally regarded as settled, coherent
discussion is simply impossible. Anyone who has ever been on a committee
knows this - there is always someone who wants to reopen the issues decided
in previous meetings, which would make it impossible to hold a constructive
discussion or make any progress toward a final decision.
Another set of reasons supporting precedent apply to some extent to the
principal, but much more to the judge. One reason is the moral desirability of
equal treatment. It is arbitrary for a case to be decided one way this week,
perhaps leading to a prisoner's execution or some other serious consequence,
and for an identical case to be decided the opposite way next week. This is
not an unshakeable imperative, but it does caution against departing from
precedent too readily. Given the critical issues that often come before the
courts, consistency seems especially important. For instance, it seems obvious
that death penalty cases should be treated as consistently as possible: life or
38. Moreover, different judges could adopt completely different First Amend-
ment theories, so a lawyer in a case before the Supreme Court would really have to
write nine different briefs based on inconsistent theories of the Constitution. Simi-
larly, the Justices themselves would often find themselves unable to discuss the merits
of particular cases with each other because they were operating within completely
different conceptual frameworks.
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death should not depend on the make-up of the bench or a judge's mood
when a particular case comes up.
A related reason for stare decisis is that only by following the reasoning
of previous decisions can the courts provide anything like a framework of
rules, rather than a series of unconnected outcomes in particular cases. If the
only available information is that an appellate court affirmed some criminal
convictions and reversed others, it is difficult to know what rule applies in the
future, especially before a different set of judges. By articulating binding
standards for the future, courts create a current legal structure, rather than
merely a barrage of individual rulings.
Stare decisis not only binds judges to the past but invites them to con-
sider the future. The knowledge that a decision will function as a precedent
has a powerful ex ante effect on the behavior of judges.39 In deciding a par-
ticular case, a judge must provide reasons which will have precedential effect
on later cases (both in the same court and in lower courts). Unless the deci-
sion is to be completely ad hoc, which will normally ensure its practical in-
significance, the judge must provide some rule or principle with future appli-
cability, which will be in turn the basis of future decisions. Thus, the judge is
pushed to a form of neutrality - not the neutrality of being value-free, but the
neutrality of articulating standards which one is willing to live with in the
future. It is in this sense that "neutral principles" are important to judicial
opinions. We expect judges, unlike politicians, to base their decisions on rea-
sons that go beyond the latest opinion polls or the vagaries of political strat-
egy. Respect for precedent pushes judges to seek generality and coherence in
their decisions. To expect the law to provide generality and coherence across
the board would be quixotic, but they are necessary ingredients of a viable
legal system.
In a constitution that promises to "establish justice" and guarantee lib-
erty "to ourselves and our posterity," precedent may play a special role. One
purpose of having a written constitution is to create a stable framework for
government. This goal would be undermined if the Court failed to give spe-
cial credence to bedrock precedents - precedents that have become the foun-
dation for large areas of important doctrines.40 It would not simply be impru-
dent to overrule these doctrines, but in an important sense, it would be run
39. This point was usefully emphasized by the legal process school. See Kent
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982
(1978).
40. Some obvious examples involve the rulings of the New Deal Era upholding
the validity of the Social Security system and other federal taxing and spending pro-
grams, and those recognizing federal jurisdiction over the economy. These omelettes
cannot be unscrambled today, as even the most devoted believers in originalism gen-
erally acknowledge. Likewise, it is far too late in the day to invalidate independent
agencies, or to undo the 20th century rulings that "incorporated" the Bill of Rights
and made it applicable to the states, or to reconsider the constitutionality of segrega-
tion.
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against the purposes of constitutionalism. Overruling these doctrines would
create just the kind of uncertainty and instability that constitutions are de-
signed to avoid. Originalists point correctly to the merits of a written constitu-
tion as a way of providing a stable framework of government. But interpreta-
tions of the text have varied greatly in a constitutional tradition that contains
Abraham Lincoln as well as John Calhoun, Hugo Black as well as Antonin
Scalia. Thus, text by itself is not enough of an anchor - respect for precedent
is also needed to avoid violent swings in the constitutional framework.
Virtually everyone acknowledges that some precedents must simply be
accepted as immutable, no matter how questionable they might have been as
an original matter.41 But foundationalists of various stripes tend to underesti-
mate the significance of this concession. The typical foundationalist response
to bedrock precedent is to say: "this far, but not an inch farther. We are will-
ing to tolerate the application of bedrock precedents on their own facts, but
we will return to first principles in considering new issues." But this is an
untenable stance in a legal system that seeks some form of coherence. What
sense does it make to say that social security is constitutional but that new
government spending programs will be struck down? Or to try to limit the
principle of Griswold to the sale of contraceptives to married couples? It
would be hard to explain such rulings with a straight face to the general pub-
lic. It is possible to have a sensible legal system in which there are a few
small patches of doctrine that are retained because of practical imperatives
but denied any influence over the decision of new issues. But a legal system
in which huge swathes of the law are considered unprincipled, while small
comers are governed by principle, makes no sense at all. Bedrock rulings
cannot be "limited to their facts" if the legal system is to have any claim to
integrity; rather, they must be given generative force as precedents.
Respecting precedent does not mean simply refusing to overrule past
decisions, but taking them seriously as starting points for analysis in future
cases. This is partly a matter of reasoning by analogy from similarities be-
tween the facts of cases, but more importantly a matter of giving credence to
the reasoning in earlier opinions. Judges' willingness to defer in this way to
their predecessors - and their expectation of similar deference from their suc-
cessors - transforms the Court from an ever-changing collection of individual
41. In any event, legitimate or not, these doctrine are here to stay as a realistic
matter. Plenary federal power over fiscal and economic matters, independent agen-
cies, and application of the Bill of Rights to the states are now integral parts of our
system of government, in some ways they are more "constitutional" than some of the
more obscure parts of the written Constitution. Which would be more shocking, a
Supreme Court decision invalidating the social security system, or one upholding a
requirement that certain homeowners rent rooms to military personnel in peacetime?
Yet, in the Third Amendment, the Constitution speaks plainly to the latter situation, in
a way that cannot be said of social security. Moreover, accepting these decisions as
irrevocable can hardly be considered a judicial usurpation of power, for these New
Deal and post-New Deal decisions have had a broad foundation of public support.
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judges to an on-going institutional actor, one which is capable of building a
continuing body of law rather than merely announcing an unending succes-
sion of one-time rulings. This kind of decision making is familiar to students
of the common law system. As the history of the common law demonstrates,
such decision making is structured enough to provide stability and coherence
but flexible enough to allow improvisation and growth.42
Like the common law, constitutional law is able to grow and change be-
cause of its reliance in precedent; and as with the common law, these changes
are generally incremental. But constitutional law is not simply a subspecies of
common law. It is not built purely on judicial precedents in the same way as
the common law. In particular, as we will see in the next section, other forms
of constitutional history also play an important role.
B. Text and History
Constitutional law is not just a matter of judicial doctrine. Other aspects
of constitutional history matter, and are sometimes decisive: the adoption of
the constitutional text in 1789 and its amendments, particularly those of the
1860s; the Federalist Papers and other writings of the Founding Fathers; and
the practices of Presidents and Congresses over the years.
Let's begin with the text. The special status of the constitutional text is
unquestioned, yet also puzzling. In a great many cases, the text plays no role
- the terms "equal protection" and "due process" simply do not tell us very
much about how to decide particular questions, nor does the phrase "the free-
dom of speech." Often, the text is quietly ignored - for example, the First
Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law" restricting the freedom
of speech or religion. The textual implication is quite obviously that the
President and the federal courts are free to censor speech or suppress minority
religions, yet no one ever makes this argument.43 Still, the constitutional text
clearly tells us some things that no judge could ignore: that Congress has the
power to regulate interstate commerce, that speech and religion receive some
special form of constitutional protection, and that the President has some type
of military authority.
It is tempting to say that the text of the Constitution is binding on us be-
cause it was validly adopted in 1789 and has never been revoked. But that
argument is ultimately as misguided as it is tempting. Suppose that in the
1790s, the Constitution had simply failed to work. Imagine, for example, that
the first Congress deadlocked and was unable to pass any laws or confirm any
42. This aspect of constitutional law is emphasized in David A. Strauss, Com-
mon Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle," 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
43. For example, since treaties are not made by "Congress," the House and Sen-
ate together, but instead by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
alone, the implication would seem to be that treaties are unlimited by the First
Amendment.
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appointments to the cabinet or the judiciary; the whole system was simply a
nonstarter. The Constitution would have become as irrelevant today as the
Articles of Confederation, even if never formally revoked.44 Or suppose that
some modem scholar discovered some defect in the original adoption of the
Constitution - for example, that the votes were miscounted or some of the
voters improperly seated, so that it actually failed to get a majority in the nec-
essary nine states. What difference would that possibly make to the binding
force of the Constitution today?
These hypotheticals demonstrate the obvious: in the end the Constitution
is binding, not because of events in 1789, but because Americans today re-
gard it as part of their fundamental law.45 There is no reason, however, to
think that Americans take the raw language of the text as gospel in the same
literalist way that some fundamentalists read the Bible, let alone that today's
Americans believe that it should be construed in the same way as it was un-
derstood two hundred years ago. Indeed, as the religious comparison shows, it
is possible to believe fervently in a text while also refusing to take it literally
and accepting later elaborations through interpretation - the role of the Tal-
mud for Orthodox Jews and of the teachings of the Church for Catholics both
illustrate this. It is a fact that Americans regard the Constitution as the basis
of our legal system; it is also a fact that they regard the Supreme Court's rul-
ings as the "law of the land."
The words of the Constitution set the parameters for constitutional de-
bate but are rarely decisive.46 The big debates, those relating to the meaning
of equality or liberty, or the extent of presidential authority or national power,
are not settled by such vague terms as equal protection, due process, execu-
tive power, or "necessary and proper." Some additional insight can be gained,
on occasion, by looking to historical context. Unlike originalists, I do not
think that the original historical context of the Constitution is in any sense
binding on us today. But reference to historical context clearly plays a role in
our constitutional practices.
Originalism, despite the frequency and fervor with which it is espoused
47by some, is at the end of the day a peculiar notion. In its most common
44. As a matter of fact, the Constitution nowhere says that it is revoking the
Articles, so it might be possible to argue that the Articles still have some kind of con-
tinuing legal effect, if anyone were to care to make such an argument. But it would be
a silly argument, since the Articles are an irrelevancy.
45. A similar point is made in Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, Defend-
ing Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMM. 455, 460 (2000).
46. Nor do I think they should be, notwithstanding the recent revival of textual-
ism. See Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999); Symposium,
Textualism and the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1085 (1998).
47. Obviously, I am rather brusquely disposing of a large issue. The literature on
this issue is now immense. For defenses of originalism, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Robert Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Rich-
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guise today, it insists that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by what a
reasonable reader of the text would have understood at the time of adoption.48
One problem with this is its indeterminacy, given the difficulty of determin-
ing what such a reasonable reader would have known in the way of back-
ground or what methods of interpretation that hypothetical reader would have
used.49 In any event, it is difficult to see why constitutional law should be a
branch of etymology. The Framers of the Constitution were of the generation
of our great-great-great-great-great-great grandparents. Much as we may re-
spect them, why on earth should our interpretations of the law be completely
controlled by the understandings of their time?
While historical context does play a role in our constitutional practice,
the conventional use of history looks quite different from originalist theory.
The Federalist Papers are often treated in a way not unlike the great opinions
of Chief Justice Marshall - as if they were bedrock precedents explicating the
Constitution. Madison and Hamilton were, among other things, penetrating
constitutional analysts, and it is not surprising that their views receive great
deference.50 But of course, they (and many of the other Framers) were also
towering figures in American history. It is not by chance that they are called
the Founding Fathers. So reference to their views is a way of connecting
modem decisions to the very formation of our country, and hence to the
American mythos. In short, these uses of history are a blend of the use of
tradition and precedent.
ard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). For critiques of
originalism, which I find ultimately persuasive, see JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975); Strauss, supra note 42.
48. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519 (2003) (explaining form of originalism sympathetically and analyzing pos-
sible critiques).
49. This and other difficulties with originalism are discussed more extensively in
Daniel Farber, For Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of
Originalism, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 167 (2000).
50. The fact that interpretations disagreeing with Madison and Hamilton even
during the adoption of the Constitution further demonstrate that, while they among the
greatest thinkers in our constitutional tradition, their constitutional interpretations are
not, and never were, infallible?
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C. Public Values
Constitutional decisions are influenced by values - by what judges per-
ceive to be the public interest.51 Sometimes this influence is conscious and
explicit in the opinions. At least as often, it is less conscious and shapes the
way a Justice reads precedent and understands history, perhaps without even
their being aware of it.
For some, the intimate connection between values and judicial decisions
is seemingly as shocking and distasteful as adolescent realization that one's
parents must once-upon-a-time have engaged in sex. But discovering law and
values in bed with each other should hardly be a shock. Law is a form of so-
cial governance, and it would be more shocking if its implementation were
devoid of human values. Indeed, the Constitution itself recognizes as much:
its goals include establishing justice, promoting the general welfare, and se-
curing liberty. It would be odd for constitutional lawyers and judges to ignore
these goals.
The real question is not whether values should enter into decisions but
how they should do so. We begin by rejecting what is sometimes considered
the pragmatist position, that judges should simply make whatever rules they
think are best for social welfare over the long run (taking into account the
social benefits of legal stability). This collapses adjudication entirely into
policymaking. It is unclear whether anyone actually takes this position,
though Richard Posner may at least come close, 52 but in any event most law-
yers would properly find this definition of the judicial role deeply mis-
guided.53
51. This is of course a point emphasized by supporters of legal pragmatism. See,
e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Thomas Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989).
52. For Posner's views, see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18
CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1996). One basis of uncertainty is what Posner means when he
speaks about the judge "making the decision that will best serve the future," id. at 8;
is this a reference to aggregate social welfare, or does it include other normative con-
siderations?
53. First, even if judges wanted to adopt this view, they would often be unable to
determine what decision would be promote social welfare. To see this, we need only
consider government institutions that actually are designed to make this kind of deci-
sion. When EPA adopts a new pollution standard, it typically has the thousands of
pages of material about the effects of the decision, some from its own scientists and
analysts, much of it contributed by outsiders as part of the rule-making process. It will
generally prepare an elaborate Regulatory Impact Analysis about the costs and bene-
fits of the regulation, which will be carefully reviewed by economists at the Office of
Management and Budget in the White House. Very little of this information and ex-
pertise is available to the Supreme Court when it issues a ruling in a constitutional
case: there are no staff social scientists assembling data and making computations.
Second, "social welfare" is not the only value, and certainly not the only
value to be enforced by judges. Increasing social wealth, or even increasing life-
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That being said, courts inevitably will sometimes find themselves in cir-
cumstances where they must consider the impact of their decisions on social
welfare. No one is likely to favor a decision that will dramatically harm the
economy, increase violent crime, or destroy the educational system. Like-
wise, choices that benefit the economy, decrease crime, and strengthen educa-
tion are likely to count in favor of a decision. When this is so, courts should
strive to get the social welfare analysis right, rather than relying on hunches.
More often, judges face questions of values that are less global and more
structured than "what is good for society?" These questions generally take
one of two forms. Sometimes the judge must decide whether a particular
value has constitutional status or how to find the boundaries of a value that
admittedly has constitutional dimensions. On other occasions, the Court in-
stead is faced with conflicting values and must somehow try to accommodate
them. The former exercise tends to be more controversial, but the latter exer-
cise is often at least as difficult.
How should judges go about identifying constitutional values? Obvi-
ously, the greater the agreement about a value, the more comfortable a judge
can feel in utilizing it.54 Courts will not always have the benefit of a clear
expectancy, are not the only thing our society cares about. We also care about norms
such as equality and human dignity. Of course, philosophers and other academics
endlessly debate the nature of these values and their significance compared with utili-
tarianism. But our society as a whole clearly endorses both personal welfare and more
intangible values. Social welfare is an important value but should not be the only
judicial concern.
Third, judges do not operate purely as individuals but as part of an institu-
tion. Governmental institutions are not interchangeable, and we must keep in mind the
role of a constitutional court in a democratic society. I will not attempt to describe the
precise parameters of that role; indeed, I doubt that a precise definition is possible.
But it's clear that the large majority of policy determinations are left to other branches
of government, and that the role of the Court is much more to establish basic ground-
rules than to control outcomes.
54. This may seem like an irrelevancy for a constitutional court, since consensus
is presumably reflected in the very legislation that the court is reviewing. But the truth
is more complicated. First, on important issues, a national consensus may exist with-
out being reflected in every region or locality. The most striking example was segre-
gation, which was entrenched in the South but had little credibility at the national
level. Recall that President Truman had already desegregated the armed forces, before
the Court even considered the issue of segregation. Other examples were the ban on
contraception in a handful of states in the 1960s, and the criminalizing of homosexual
acts in a few states in the 1990s.
Second, contrary to the vision in which important value issues are fully de-
liberated through the legislative process before law is made, political actors have
significant slack which they can use even in the face of a public consensus about
values. Important constitutional interest can be invaded without full debate through
executive fiat. A key role of the courts is to limit this practice. An important tool is
the canon of interpreting legislation to avoid serious constitutional doubts, which
means that the executive must return to Congress for clear authorization before step-
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consensus, however. At the very least, judges should try to ensure that sup-
port for a value is not limited to a particular political perspective - for exam-
ple, they should consider whether support for the value cuts across party
lines. It is also here that "tradition" plays a role. Traditions do not come
neatly packaged in a way that provides clear answers to constitutional ques-
tions. They often contain disparate strands and contested elements. But a
judge should be able to show that a value has genuine roots of some kind in
American traditions. The argument is even stronger if the judge can show that
historic failure to apply a traditional value in a particular context is due to
factors that do not deserve respect, such as racist or sexist prejudices or re-
sentment of political dissenters.
IV. ROE REVISITED
With this background discussion behind us, it is time to take a look at
Roe and see how it stands up under the "arbitrary and capricious" test. But
first, it is necessary to determine exactly what Roe actually held.55
A. The Holding in "Roe"
The first thing to observe is that what is called "Roe" was actually not
one case but two: Roe v. Wade56 and Doe v. Bolton.57 The extent to which the
Justices regarded the two as interconnected is shown by the haphazard way
that the separate concurring and dissenting opinions are scattered between the
two cases. Yet commentators generally read the opinion in Roe v. Wade with-
out taking into account its Siamese twin, the Doe opinion.
It is helpful, particularly regarding Doe, to begin with the lower court
opinions. In Roe v. Wade,58 a three-judge district court issued a declaratory
judgment against the constitutionality of the Texas abortion statute. That stat-
ute was a flat criminal ban on abortion, with only a narrow exception for
abortions "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother."5 9 The district court observed that "[fjreedom to
ping into constitutional dangerous territory. Even within Congress, constitutional
issues can be suppressed, as when a rider is attached to critical legislation at the last
minute. Constitutional litigation can help defend consensus values against such sneak
attacks.
55. Information about the Court's consideration of the case is now available
from the files of several former Justices. For useful background, see LINDA
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY 72-101 (2005); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE
BURGER COURT 83-131(1988).
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
58. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Tex. 1970).
59. Id. at 1219 n.2.
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choose in the matter of abortions has been accorded the status of a 'funda-
mental' right in every case coming to the attention of this Court where the
question has been raised.,' 60 The district court then cited two other district
court opinions (in D.C. and Wisconsin), along with a South Dakota trial court
decision and a decision of the California Supreme Court.61 The district court
in Roe went on, however, to observe that "[t]o be sure, the defendant has pre-
sented the Court with several compelling justifications for state presence in
the area of abortions," one of which "may well" be "[c]oncern over abortion
of the 'quickened' fetus.' 62 But the district court held the statute to be fatally
overbroad because it went so far beyond the arguably compelling justifica-
tions, and found it unconstitutionally vague because of the difficulty of de-
termining what kind of risk to the mother's life would be sufficient.
63
Doe was another action brought before a three-judge district court, this
time in Georgia. 64 The Georgia abortion statute was newer and more liberal
than the Texas statute. (The Texas statute was a sweeping ban on abortions;
the Georgia statute allowed a wider range of justifications for abortion, al-
though it imposed stringent procedural requirements.) In reviewing the con-
stitutionality of the statute, the court held that:
[A]lthough the state may not unduly limit the reasons for which a
woman seeks an abortion, it may legitimately require that the deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy be one reached only upon consid-
eration of more factors than the desires of the woman and her abil-
ity to find a willing physician.65
In the court's view, the state's interest in potential human life gave it the
power to regulate the quality and safety of the abortion decision, but not to
review the ultimate basis for the woman's decision. 66 "[O]nce the embryo has
formed, the decision to abort its development cannot be considered a purely
private one affecting only husband and wife, man and Woman." 67 The court
agreed with the apparent view of the Georgia legislature that this was primar-
ily a medical decision "inasmuch as medical practitioners are in the best posi-
tion by virtue of training to judge concurrently the basis as well as the risk
inherent in such a decision."68 The court said that the state could introduce
safeguards such as "consultation with a licensed minister or secular guidance
counselor" in order to "guard against the establishment of transient 'abortion
60. Id. at 1222.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1223.
63. Id.
64. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
65. Id. at 1055.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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mills' by the occasional opportunistic or unethical practitioner and the con-
comitant dangers to his patrons and the public."69 The court viewed the medi-
cal approval process of the Georgia statute (described in more detail below)
as legitimate, but struck down the statute's restricted list of allowable reasons
for abortions.7°
The parts of the court's order striking down portions of the statute were
appealable to the Fifth Circuit, but the part upholding the medical approval
process was appealable directly to the Supreme Court due to the vagaries of
the law of federal jurisdiction at the time. The Supreme Court struck down
most of the provisions regarding medical procedures and approval.7I Those
provisions were actually quite onerous, requiring a hospital accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (in addition to accreditation
by the state) to perform the abortion; a written statement by the woman's
physicians that she met one of the reasons specified in the statute; the written
concurrence of two other physicians based on their own examination of the
patient; and approval by a committee of at least three members of the hospi-
tal's staff.
72
Of all the many and often virulent criticisms surrounding the Court's
abortion jurisprudence, I cannot recall anyone defending the procedural pro-
visions of the Georgia statute. This is understandably so. Even assuming that
states are completely free to place whatever substantive limits they like on
abortion, these procedures would still be vulnerable to attack. Compliance
would be extremely burdensome and the delay could well increase the risk of
the procedure, thus a procedural due process challenge seems quite plausible.
Indeed, in the first draft of Justice Blackmun's opinion, he held that the
Georgia statute violated procedural due process because it provided "no op-
portunity to be heard, to know the reasons why she is denied an abortion, or
to appeal an adverse decision." 73 Furthermore, the procedures implicate the
right to privacy in the narrowest sense - they require the woman to be physi-
cally examined by non-treating physicians, and they require intimate aspects
of her personal life (for example, her mental health) to be reviewed by an
additional group of strangers. One need not believe in any sweeping vision of
privacy to reject the idea that the State is entitled to subject women to such
intrusive physical and mental examinations by strangers without having some
strong justification.
Of equal significance, however, is the portion of the Georgia statute up-
held by the Supreme Court. Given that the district court had struck down the
list of permissible justifications that must be certified by the physician, all
that was left was this: "it still remains a crime for a physician to perform an
69. Id. at 1056.
70. Id.
71. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194, 197, 199 (1973).
72. Id. at 184.
73. SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 98.
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abortion except when... it is 'based upon his best clinical judgment that an
abortion is necessary."' 74 This truncated provision was challenged on vague-
ness grounds. 75 The Court not only rejected the vagueness attack but also
went out of its way to endorse the provision. As the Court interpreted the
truncated provision, it required the physician to make this decision in "light
of all the attendant circumstances," ranging "farther afield wherever his
medical judgment, properly and professionally exercised, so dictates and di-
rects him.",76 As the Court said, "[w]hether, in the words of the Georgia stat-
ute, 'an abortion is necessary' is a professional judgment that the Georgia
physician will be called upon to make routinely." 77 That judgment was to be
"exercised in the light of all factors - physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age - relevant to the well-being of the patient."
78
The Court referred approvingly to the district court's observation that a deci-
sion of medical necessity was generally made before other forms of surgery.
The Court had more to say about the physician's role in Roe. Prior to the
second trimester, the Court said, "the attending physician, in consultation
with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in
his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated." 79 Up to
the point where the state's interest in maternal health or potential life become
compelling, "the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primar-
ily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the phy-
sician. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper
medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are
available."8
0
The remainder of the Roe holding is the familiar trimester system - no
state regulation in the first trimester, health regulation in the second trimester
(because the abortion is then riskier than full-term pregnancy), and limitation
to life or health justifications in the third trimester (because the state's interest
in protecting potential life becomes compelling after viability.)8 '
Read in the context of Doe, the trimester system has a subtle twist. The
state can insist all the way through pregnancy that abortions be based on
medical considerations (i.e., life or health of the mother). What the third tri-
mester marks is not a change in the types of allowable abortion, but rather a
change in how the state can implement the restriction. In the first two trimes-
ters, the state must delegate implementation to physicians, reviewing their
decisions only for good faith. In the final trimester, state can police more
74. Id. at 191.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 192.
78. Id. at 192.
79. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
80. Id. at 166.
81. Id. at 164-65.
2005] 1253
23
Farber: Farber: Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
aggressively to ensure that medical necessity is present. In short, as Doe and
Roe are written, the shift is from a subjective, good faith standard to an objec-
tive one.
The dissenters characterized the holding broadly:
At the heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring
pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of
the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one of more of
a variety of reasons - convenience, family planning, economics,
dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The
common claim before us is that for any one of such reasons, or for
no reason at all, ... any woman is entitled to an abortion at her re-
quest if she is able to find a medical adviser willing to undertake
the procedure.
The Court for the most part sustains this position: During the period
prior to the time the fetus become viable, the Constitution of the
United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the preg-
nanct woman more than the life or potential life of the fetus ....
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence took a narrower view of the holding:
"[T]he dissenting views discount the reality that the vast majority of physi-
cians observe the standards of their profession, and act only on the basis of
carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life and health."83
Burger's characterization clearly seems the more accurate given that the
Court had upheld criminal punishment for physicians who performed abor-
tions without determining them to be medically necessary in Doe. Indeed, at
one point in Roe, the Court quotes an AMA abortion resolution emphasizing
"'the best interests of the patient,' 'sound clinical judgment,' and 'informed
patient consent,' in contrast to 'mere acquiescence to the patient's de-
mand." 8 4 Certainly, the Court did not seem to regard abortions as elective in
the same sense as cosmetic surgery. So far as I know, no state has ever made
it a criminal offense to perform nose jobs or tummy tucks without first mak-
ing a written determination of medical necessity. If a state did so, no doubt
this would be regarded as a substantial restriction on the availability of these
procedures.
The upshot of Roe and Doe, then, is that the state may limit abortion to
cases of medical necessity in the first two trimesters, but cannot exclude any
factors that a reasonable physician might find relevant, nor single out abortion
decisions for special oversight, unlike other medical procedures. After the
third trimester the state can be more intrusive and forbid abortions, using the
82. Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
84. Id. at 143-44.
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criminal law to oversee the decision. In assessing what the Court did in Roe,
we must begin with what the Court said it was doing, not with the dissent's
characterization.
In order to get to this result, the Court had to work its way through two
related issues. First, it had to find some basis for heightened scrutiny. Clearly,
abortion statutes are valid under the rational basis test, if only because that
test is so utterly toothless. So the Court had to justify more stringent review.
Then, it had to take into account the state's interest in protecting the unborn,
to determine whether or when that interest was sufficient to justify abortion
restrictions under the applicable test. The key to analyzing the "Roe" deci-
sions is determining how well the Court performed these tasks and whether
the rulings were arbitrary and capricious.
B. Assessing the Court's Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
Justice Blackmun conceded that the Constitution does not contain an
explicit right of privacy.85 He relied, however, on a series of rulings finding
some aspect of privacy to be protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments, and by the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment.
86
He viewed these cases as showing that only fundamental rights or those in-
herent in ordered liberty are protected, and that privacy extends to aspects of
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education."87 Blackmun then argued that this right of family/reproductive
privacy was broad enough to cover "a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy" for the following reasons:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for
it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and con-
tinuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.88
As discussed earlier, a constitutional rule should consider precedent, his-
tory (including text), and public values. In reviewing precedent, Blackmun
85. Id. at 152.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 153.
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was correct to identify a cluster of cases protecting various aspects of pri-
vacy,89 and a tighter cluster relating to intimate relations and reproductive
choice.9° This makes his characterization of abortion as a constitutionally
protected decision plausible. Still, the analysis of precedent seems strikingly
incomplete. It is not clear whether "privacy" is a sufficiently cohesive con-
cept to hold the broader group of cases together. The narrower, inti-
macy/reproduction cluster of cases, are more apropos. But Blackmun could
have done more to explain how these cases cohere, and how they relate to the
Fourteenth Amendment's reference to liberty. In this respect, Justice Stew-
art's concurring opinion is much more satisfactory. 91 Justice Blackmun's
discussion of the consequences of unwanted pregnancy suggests another pos-
sible line of argument, contending that abortion is a constitutionally protected
decision because those particular types of harms are peculiarly "private" and
akin to those involved in earlier family/reproduction cases.
The opinion also sketches an argument regarding public values as a ba-
sis for liberalizing abortion rules. The paragraph quoted above shows that
banning abortion imposes serious harm on some women. Justice Blackmun
also reviewed the history of abortion reform at the time, which showed a
strong trend in the direction of liberalization. 92 Moreover, he seems quite
correct that the strong form of abortion opposition, which regards the fetus as
a legal person and abortion as murder, has not taken hold in our legal system
or commanded any societal consensus.
The opinion is at its weakest, however, in dealing with the second prong
of constitutional argument - history. Blackmun makes no claim that family
and reproductive rights in particular, or privacy more generally, concerned
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. He might have been able to mount
a historical argument with regard to family and reproduction - after all, the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment must have had the intrusions of slav-
ery on human rights in mind, including the notorious destruction of family
relations and elimination of sexual autonomy. Perhaps more seriously,
Blackmun was faced with a strong contrary tradition of abortion prohibition
extending back into the nineteenth-century. Blackmun does a bit to under-
mine the force of this tradition by showing that opposition to abortion was at
least in part (and perhaps in large part) motivated by the riskiness of the pro-
cedure.93 He also shows that the anti-abortion tradition is less deeply rooted
than it might seem, because of indications that abortion was lawful at com-
mon law prior to quickening, and also because the moral status of the fetus
has been disputed by philosophers and theologians for centuries. 94 This is all
89. See cases cited id. at 152.
90. See cases cited id. at 152-53.
91. Id. at 167-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 143-48 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 148-52.
94. Id. at 134-50.
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very well, but the argument would have been stronger if Blackmun could
have undermined the tradition's force by discrediting its roots - for instance,
if he had shown that anti-abortion laws were connected with the subordinate
position of women 95 or that their primary support rested on narrowly sectar-
ian views rather than a broad public consensus.
The idea that the Constitution requires the government to have more
than the slightest of conceivable rational bases before it dictates who to marry
or whether to have children should not be particularly alarming. Current pub-
lic values would find government regulation of contraception intolerable. For
this reason, Griswold v. Connecticut's96 protection of contraception seems to
have been readily accepted by lawyers and the public, regardless of whatever
theoretical problems it raises. In Roe, Blackmun provides the beginning of a
plausible argument for including abortion within the same constitutional cate-
gory as contraception, notwithstanding the seemingly strong contrary weight
of tradition. But the argument is in great need of further development.
If the Court were an administrative agency, it would have presented
enough of an argument in support of its identification of a protected right to
avoid outright reversal as arbitrary and capricious. It did consider relevant
factors such as earlier privacy rulings, and it gave a general indication of how
these rulings beared on the abortion issue. Still, there were significant gaps in
the argument. A reviewing court would probably not be satisfied with a simi-
larly sketchy argument by an administrative agency. Thus, if the Court were
an administration agency, it's ruling would probably have been remanded for
a fuller explanation of the agency's reasoning.
97
C. Assessing the Court's Balancing of Conflicting Interests
The Court acknowledged the State's "important and legitimate interest
in protecting the potentiality of human life," along with its interest in protect-
ing maternal health.98 With respect to the health justification, the Court al-
lowed the State to impose more burdensome regulations after the first trimes-
ter, when abortion becomes riskier than full-term pregnancy. 99 It also allowed
the State to require the abortion to be performed by a physician even in the
first trimester. 1
00
95. See Reva Siegal, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261
(1992).
96. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. Justice Blackmun's law clerk urged that he provide a fuller explanation. See
GREENHOUSE, supra note 55, at 90. I have not found any information concerning the
reasons for Justice Blackmun's failure to heed this suggestion.
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
99. Id. at 163.
100. Id.
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The more troublesome issue for the Court was the State's interest in lim-
iting abortion to preserve potential human life. On this basis, the Court al-
lowed abortions to be limited to those needed to protect the mother's life or
health after the second trimester. It concluded that the State's interest became
compelling in the third trimester "because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."'' In effect, Doe v.
Bolton provides another safeguard by allowing the state to limit earlier abor-
tions to those that are "necessary" in some sense, rather than allowing the
physician to perform an abortion whenever the patient requests one and the
medical risks are minimal. 102 The court provided no evidence, however, that
doctors would in fact exercise a meaningful check on the abortion decision.'
3
To some extent, any effort to accommodate conflicting interests will in-
volve drawing somewhat arbitrary lines, as the Justices seem to have realized
at the time.1 4 But the trimester system seems more arbitrary than most, with
only a single sentence in the opinion to justify it.105 There was certainly noth-
ing inevitable about this choice. As we now know, the Justices had consid-
101. Id. at 163-64.
102. The latter is presumably the current test used for cosmetic surgery, rather
than any requirement that a physician find that a nose job or breast enhancement is
medically necessary.
103. Whether doctors should do so is clearly another question, but the Court
clearly thought they would. If doctors did so, they might provide a significant protec-
tion against unnecessary intrusions on the state's interest in protecting potential life.
In effect, abortions would be limited to the "medically necessary," with doctors acting
as agents of the state to enforce the limitation. The Court might well had benefited
from further fact-finding on this issue, based on practices in states that had liberalized
their abortion laws. Justice Blackmun, at least, seemed to have a somewhat unrealistic
understanding of modem medical practice, referring to the physician as serving the
woman "essentially as the family physician so esteemed in memory." SCHWARTZ,
supra note 55, at 135.
104. See Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1989, at
DI.
105. A fuller discussion, for example, might have included the following issues:
1. To what extent would responsible exercise of professional judgment by
physicians under a rule like Georgia's protect the state's interest in poten-
tial life during the first two trimesters? Should the state be allowed to use
procedural safeguards less onerous than Georgia's?
2. Are there other stages in embryonic development (for example, devel-
opment of the nervous system) that would suggest some intermediate level
of protection earlier than the final trimester?
3. To what extent would restrictions after the first trimester actually im-
pact the availability of abortions? Notably, this factor involved a number
of circumstances; for example, today the availability of self-testing kits
makes early detection of pregnancy much more likely.
4. Should the Court allow states to pursue various other options until suf.
ficient evidence was available about their impact on women seeking abor-
tions?
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ered drawing the line after the first trimester, but the majority decided not to,
in part because women might not see physicians until near the end of the first
trimester. 106 To the end, Justice Douglas preferred the first-trimester dividing
line. 10
7
It seems inconceivable that an administrative agency, dealing with such
questions as air pollution regulation, telecommunication, or even standards
for workplace toilets, would get away with such causal resolution of an im-
portant issue. It is little wonder that this aspect of the decision was soon
eroded l s and ultimately rejected.'0 9 It simply failed to cross the threshold of
reasoned decisionmaking. Early in the consideration of Doe, Justice Douglas
observed that "[w]e don't know how this statute operates." 1 10 The Court still
did not have the information it needed to interpret the statute a year later, but
proceeded anyway and announced its decision." I
Justice Stewart privately faulted the Blackmun opinion for being "quite
so inflexibly 'legislative"' in establishing the trimester system.112 A more
flexible approach, such as the "undue burden" test later adopted in Casey,
would have given the Court the opportunity to learn the facts it needed to
reach a sound accommodation between women's rights and the counterveil-
ing state interest.
V. CONCLUSION
What does it take to make a constitutional ruling defensible, even if
nevertheless debatable? I have suggested, based on an analogy with admin-
strative law, that the ruling must rest on a reasoned application of the relevant
factors - those factors being precedent, history, and public values in the con-
stitutional law context. It is unrealistic to expect judges to produce perfectly
crafted opinions, and some cases do not require a full consideration of each of
these factors. Still, in hard cases, a responsible Court should provide a coher-
ent, believable claim in these terms. This does not guarantee the correctness
of the decision, but does make the decision something other than an exercise
of raw judicial power. In other words, whether or not we agree with the re-
sult, we must agree that the Justices have done their job.
106. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 55, at 97.
107. Id.
108. See Daniel Farber and John Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Ex-
perience with the 1980's "Reasonableness" Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519 (1990).
109. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (replacing
the trimester system with an "undue burden" test).
110. SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 85. The first draft of Blackmun's opinion re-
manded for further information about how the statue impacted poor and minority
women, a concern that was absent from the final opinion. See id. at 101-02.
111. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
112. See id. at 150.
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Roe v. Wade is only a partial success under this standard. Its argument
for recognizing a fundamental right works in the right direction but was badly
in need of elaboration. More seriously, the Court made almost no effort to
justify the trimester system. That failing was all the more serious because it
was gratuitous. All the Court needed to do in the cases before it was (a) to
rule the procedural safeguards excessive and overly intrusive in the Georgia
case, (b) uphold Georgia' requirement that the physician certify medical ne-
cessity, and (c) affirm the lower court's declaratory judgment against Texas's
sweeping abortion ban because it prohibited medically necessary abortions.
The rest could have been left to the states and the lower courts in the first
instance, allowing a much better developed factual record and far more com-
plete analysis of the various options.1
3
Given the stark emotions raised by the abortion issue, it is not clear
whether this course would have done the Court much good politically. Still,
giving the states more flexibility and making the role of medical necessity as
a restriction clearer might have ignited less of a firestorm.' 4 In any event, a
decision along those lines would have had a better claim to represent reason
rather than fiat. Of course, hindsight is always easy, and we have now had
many more years to consider the constitutional dimensions of the abortion
issue. The point is not to blame Justice Blackmun and his colleagues for issu-
ing an imperfect opinion thirty-some years ago. Rather, it is to urge the Court
to do better in the future.
113. Perhaps the Court was trying to give more guidance to legislatures about how
to update their abortion laws. But it is hard to see what providing a detailed legislative
roadmap was more urgent than in other important constitutional cases such as Brown.
114. An opinion along these lines would, however, have received a less favorable
response from feminists seeking unrestrictive reproductive autonomy for women.
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